Over the last two decades, policymakers and academics have expressed concern over the potential risk of substantial amounts of employer stock in defined contribution (DC) pension plans. In particular, for some workers, such holdings not only introduce a substantial amount of undiversifiable risk into the retirement-asset portfolio, but can be doubly costly due to a positive correlation between company stock prices, worker earnings, employment prospects in poorly performing firms. Layoffs and steep declines in share values at companies like Enron and Global Crossing, which resulted in catastrophic job losses as well as losses in 401(k) assets, brought many of these issues to the forefront in policy debates.
An important provision of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA2006) was the establishment of new rules on the diversification of DC assets away from employer stock as step toward addressing these concerns. This paper measures the extent to which DC plans have shifted the composition of plan assets away from employer stock as a result of the PPA diversification provisions. It adds to the findings of a number of previous studies that have attempted to elucidate and quantify the risks to diversification from holding company stock, including Brennan and Torous (1999) , Benartzi (2001) , Muelbrook (2002) , Liang and Weisbenner (2002) , Purcell (2002) , Poterba (2003) , Even and Macpherson (2004) , Mitchell and Utkus (2004) , Weisbenner (2006, 2007) , and Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007), among others. 1 This study focuses on company stock held in DC plans that are Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) for two reasons. First, many large firms that have significant shares of retirement-plan assets in company stock, including some of the more notorious cases, such as 1 There has been relatively little written thus far on the economic impacts of PPA2006. Schwartz (2009, 2010) examined the impact of the DB funding provisions in the law on the cost of corporate debt and stock returns, respectively. Engelhardt (2011) examined the impact of the law on auto-enrollment in 401(k) plans. This paper is organized as follows. Section I provides brief background on PPA2006.
Section II discusses the Form 5500 data and methods used in the empirical analysis. The empirical results are presented in section III. There is a brief conclusion.
I. Background on the Pension Protection Act of 2006
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA2006) has been viewed by many as the most important piece of pension legislation since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974. Although many of the main provisions applied to DB plans, the law contained a number of important changes for DC plans. These are discussed in detail in Purcell (2006a) .
Since 1987, Section 401(a)(28) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) governed diversification of employer stock in ESOPs. It held that plans with such stock had to allow qualified participants to diversify out of employer stock. A "qualified participant" was defined as being at least age 55 and with 10 years of participation in the ESOP. In addition, the timing of the diversification was allowed in the six-year period after qualification, within which, as much as 25% of company-stock holdings could be divested in each of the first five years, and as much as 50% in the sixth year. The actual diversification election could occur once per year within a 90-day window after the conclusion of each plan year. Essentially, diversification was phased and limited to longer-tenure workers at the end of their careers.
By adding IRC Section 401(a)(35), the PPA eased restrictions on diversification in a number of ways. First, it changed the definition of a qualified participant to any participant with at least three years of service, regardless of age. Second, upon qualification, the participant could divest 100% of the account for contributions after 2007. Contributions prior to 2007 are allowed to be divested over a 3-year period, one-third per year (Burgess, 2011) . Third, the Act required that the diversification election be offered at least once per quarter. The diversification itself had to occur across at least 3 investment funds of materially different risk and return characteristics, effectively in accordance with IRC Section 404(c).
Importantly, the diversification provisions in the PPA applied to all DC plans with assets held in employer stock, with the exception of stand-alone ESOPs, i.e., those that do not allow for elective pre-tax deferrals under Section 401(k) or after-tax deferrals under Section 401(m) was exempt from these requirements. This exception is critical to the identification strategy for the empirical analysis outlined below.
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Two other DC provisions in the PPA are relevant for this study. The Act clarified that federal law allowing negative elections in 401(k)s superseded state wage-payment laws that in some states forbade employers from making deductions from pay without the written consent of the employee. These laws were seen as impediments to the adoption of automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, and, after PPA2006, there was a substantial expansion in auto-enrolled 401(k)s (Purcell, 2006b; Nessmith, Utkus, and Young, 2007; VanDerhei, 2010; Engelhardt, 2011) . The PPA also set out safe-harbor provisions for nondiscrimination testing in auto-enrolled 401(k)s. Therefore, at the same time that plans with employee elective deferrals were allowing many participants to diversify holdings in company stock, there was an economy-wide expansion in employee deferrals in auto-enrolled 401(k) plans.
2 There is some ambiguity as to whether the diversification provisions also apply to stock bonus plans that do not allow employee elective deferrals or after-tax contributions. Technically, these are profit-sharing plans that make the discretionary employer contributions in the form of stock. Stock bonus plans are often treated synonymously with ESOPs (Allen, Melone, Rosenblum, and Mahoney, 2003) . However, the transitional and final regulations concerning employer-stock diversification only specifically mentioned ESOPs. For this reason, the empirical analysis below focuses only on ESOPs. When the analysis sample is expanded to include stock bonus plans, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
II. Data and Empirical Methods

A. Data and Aggregate Statistics
The data for the empirical analysis below are drawn from annual IRS Form 5500 filings Tables 1 and 2 contains 72,601 unique DC plans and 352,338 plan-year observations.
Previous studies have documented that there are a relatively small number of DC plans with company stock. However, these are relatively large plans in terms of the number of participants. Thus, the total number of individuals potentially affected by retirement income exposure to company stock is large (Liang and Weisbenner, 2002; Mitchell and Utkus, 2004; Purcell, 2002 ; among others).
The results in Table 1 , which gives basic aggregate statistics for all DC plans by year, bear this out. In 2003, out of a total of 47,972 DC plans (column 1), 4,104, or 8.6%, had company stock as an asset (columns 2 and 3, respectively). However, these plans averaged 3,551 participants (column 5), about four times the average for all plans (column 4). Therefore, of the 44 million DC plan participants then (column 6), 14.6 million were in plans potentially exposed to company stock risk (column 7). This corresponded to one-third of all DC plan participants (column 8).
Looking 
B. Empirical Methods
The basic empirical approach is a difference-in-difference analysis, comparing the share of company stock in KSOPs to stand-alone ESOPs, before versus after 2006. Company stock in
ESOPs represented 76% of all company stock in DC plans and 67% of all participants with company stock in DC plans prior to 2006. This strategy will identify the short-run impact of PPA2006 as long as there are no other reasons why company stock as a share of plan assets would be changing, relatively, for plans with and without elective deferrals at this time. The alternative that there may have been some other shock over this time period that caused a relative shift in company-stock holdings cannot be ruled out completely, but it seems somewhat unlikely given the prominence and industry coverage of the diversification provisions in PPA2006.
However, special attention in the empirical analysis will be paid to the expansion of autoenrollment in 401(k) plans during this time period, much of which was spurred by the PPA2006, an obvious potential confounder. Table 3 shows data on the share of assets held in company stock for all ESOPS by the presence of elective deferrals and time periods. Throughout the remainder of the paper, the term "elective deferrals" will refer to both pre-tax deferrals under Section 401(k) and after-tax deferrals under Section 401(m). The sample is comprised of 14,463 ESOP plan-year observations. In the first row of panel A, there is a decrease in the company-stock share for
IV. Empirical Results
A. Simple Difference-in-Difference Evidence
ESOPs that allow elective deferrals (KSOPs) of 6.7 percentage points. These plans were subject to the diversification provisions in the PPA. In the second row, there essentially was no change in the company-stock share for stand-alone ESOPs. These plans were not subject to the diversification provisions. The difference-in-difference estimate in the third row indicates that PPA2006 was associated with a 7.1 percentage-point decline in the share of assets in company stock. Given the pre-2006 average share of 37.4 percentage points (row 1, column 1), this is a substantive decline in company-stock holdings, on the order of 19% (i.e., 0.19=0.071/0.374). As most company stock is held in relatively larger plans (Table 1) , panel B in Table 3 undertakes a corresponding difference-in-difference calculation weighting plans by the number of participants. The bottom row indicates that PPA2006 was associated with a somewhat larger decline in the share of assets in company stock of 13.2 percentage points. Overall, these results suggest that the diversification provisions in the PPA had some impact on the holdings of company stock. To explore this further, the analysis next moves to a regression framework.
B. Regression-Based Evidence
Let i, j, and t, index the plan, industry, and calendar year, respectively. Then Table 4 presents estimates from the following econometric specification:
where the dependent variable, S, is the share of plan assets in company stock; is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the plan allowed elective deferrals (KSOP);
2006 , is a dummy that takes on a value of one if the calendar year was after 2006; is a vector of calendar-year dummies; is a vector of industry dummies; and u is a disturbance term.
The primary objective is to obtain consistent estimates of , which represent the difference-indifference estimates of the impact of the PPA company-stock diversification provisions on company-stock holdings in ESOPs. The key identifying assumption is that there were no other changes in the pension landscape during the 2003-9 period that differentially affected the company-stock holdings of stock-based plans that allow elective deferrals, but not those that do not allow such deferrals.
Industry is measured using the six-digit business code on the Form 5500. This code is based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The first two digits of the code correspond to 18 broad industry classifications. The industry effects, , used in (1) are at the three-digit level and correspond to 80 industrial classifications. where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the plan had more than 10% of assets in company stock and zero otherwise. Ten percent is the statutory limit on employer stock in DB plans. Columns 3-5 show the estimates from the same specification, but when the dependent variable has the company-stock threshold at shares of 25%, 50% and 75%, respectively, i.e., as plans become increasingly concentrated in company stock.
The difference-in-difference estimates in columns 2-5 show that the largest absolute reductions in the share of company stock occurred for plans that had one-quarter or more of assets in company stock (column 3). However, the reductions relative to the pre-2006 average shares were largest for plans that had one-half or more of assets in company stock (columns 4 and 5). For example, after the PPA, the participant-weighted company-stock share fell by 17.6 percentage points in plans with one-half or more of assets in company stock (column 4), controlling for calendar year and industry, on a pre-2006 base of 23.8 percentage points (bottom row of the table), or a 74% reduction in the incidence of very highly concentrated plans.
C. Extensions and Robustness Checks
One potential concern with the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 is that the PPA contained other provisions for DC plans. If these other changes happened to have differentially affected company-stock holdings in plans with and without elective deferrals, then the key identification assumption in the difference-in-difference framework would be violated, rendering the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 biased and inconsistent. The most important of these provisions was the clarification of the legal status of auto-enrollment in 401(k)s, and the establishment of rules for plan design that created a safe harbor for auto-enrolled 401(k)s from nondiscrimination testing.
These two changes led to a rapid increase in the adoption of auto-enrolled 401(k) plans after 2006 (Engelhardt, 2011) , primarily in place of existing affirmative election 401(k)s. Under the PPA safe harbor rules, a plan with automatic enrollment will be deemed to have satisfied nondiscrimination testing if it provides a minimum employer matching contribution of 100% on elective deferrals up to 1% of employee pay, and 50% on elective deferrals between 1% and 6% of pay. If these matching contributions were not in company stock, this could have driven down the share of company stock in plans with elective deferrals after 2006, biasing the estimates in Tables 3-5 away from zero (i.e., making the effects of PPA seem bigger than in actuality).
To address this potential concern, Table 5 repeats the analysis in Table 4 , but excludes from the sample the observations for all calendar years from plans that reported auto-enrollment in 2009. This strips from the sample any plan that ever adopted auto-enrollment. The difference-in-difference estimates in Table 5 Column 2 shows estimates of from
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the plan design allows the participant to only partially direct the investment of assets in the plan. As many stock-based plans placed restrictions on the ability of participants to direct the investment of assets, especially employer contributions in the form of employer stock, the incidence of partial direction should have fallen with the adoption of the diversification provisions under the PPA.
Hence, in (4) should be negative. The difference-in-difference estimate of in panel A of column 2 of the table is negative, modest in size, but highly statistically significant. It suggests that the fraction of plans with elective deferrals that had only partial participant direction fell by 8.3 percentage points relative to plans without, after relative to before the enactment of the PPA.
The participant-weighted estimate in panel B is also negative, but suggests impacts of the PPA that are much larger in magnitude. negative and large. Overall, the evidence in Table 6 on the incidence of plan features is consistent with the quantitative evidence on company-stock shares in Tables 3-5 . Together, the empirical results in these tables suggest that in the short run the PPA induced a substantive amount of diversification of employer stock in DC plan.
V. Conclusion
This study has focused on the short-run impact of the diversification rules in PPA2006 on holdings of company stock in DC plans, in general, and ESOPs, in particular. Using detailed of assets in company stock, the statutory limit for defined benefit pension plans, suggesting that, despite the PPA provisions, substantial retirement assets may still be subject to undiversifiable company-stock risk.
There are two important caveats to this analysis. First, this is only a short-run impact analysis. In particular, for some plans in the "after" period, the phase-in of the diversification of company stock accumulated prior to 2006 had not fully occurred (these were to be phased in over a three-year period). Therefore, almost surely the estimates in the paper are lower bounds on the movement out of company stock in ESOPs. Second, a key policy issue is the determination of the composition and risk profile of the new assets in the affected plans from what was formerly employer stock: in particular, when participants diversified out of positions in company stock, where did that money go? Into money-market funds, bond funds, stock funds, etc.? This is a key next step in determining just how much PPA2006 has reduced undiversifiable retirement-income risk, and important avenue for future research. 5500 data on all single-employer DC plans with 100 or more participants. All 403(b), multiemployer, and collectively bargained plans have been excluded from the sample. Column 3 is column 2 divided by column 1; column 8 is column 7 divided by column 6. 
